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Abstract. We propose a scheme to preserve the anonymity of users in proof-
of-asset transactions. We assume bitcoin-like cryptocurrency systems in which
a user must prove the strength of its assets (i.e., solvency), prior conducting
further transactions. The traditional way of addressing such a problem is the
use of blind signatures, i.e., a kind of digital signature whose properties satisfy
the anonymity of the signer. Our work focuses on the use of a designated verifier
signature scheme that limits to only a single authorized party (within a group
of signature requesters) to verify the correctness of the transaction.
Keywords: Blind signature schemes, Anonymity, Designated verification, Cryp-
tocurrencies, Identity-based Cryptography, Bilinear pairings.
1 Introduction
Blind signature schemes offer a practical way of handling privacy constraints in cryp-
tocurrencry transactions [3]. A blind signature construction is essentially an interactive
two-party protocol between the signer of a message and a group of signature requesters.
The signer disguises the contents of the message, before signing it. This way, the signa-
ture requesters can verify the correctness of the operation, without learning anything
about the message that has been signed. However, the validity of the signature can be
verified by anyone within the group of requesters. There may be situations in which
a particular signer wants to designate that just one entity in the group of receivers
must able to verify the signature (and not the others). This is the objective of DVS
(Designated Verifier Signature) schemes [9,12] addressed in this paper.
In the realm of blockchain cryptocurrencies (i.e., bitcoin-like digital cash schemes),
the aforementioned situation may appear in the so-called proof-of-asset transactions,
in which users must prove their solvency prior getting access to online services such as
cryptocurrency exchange markets. In other words, situations in which users must prove
that they control a given amount of assets (i.e., bitcoins) but without releasing the
specific amount they owe. In addition, we assume situations in which the users want to
uniquely designate who can verify those proof-of-asset transactions, e.g., to avoid that
a leakage of the proof is used by other parties (i.e., advertisement services, gambling
platforms, etc.).
We address the aforementioned challenges and present a designated verifier blind
signature (DVS) construction using pairing-based cryptography. The security of our
scheme relies on the hardness of the computational and the decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem (cf. Appendix A). We analyze the security of the approach and per-
form an efficiency comparison w.r.t. other existing similar approaches.
Paper Organization — Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 provides some
preliminaries. Section 4 presents our construction and discusses about the security and
efficiency of our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Following seminal work by Chaum [3], Boldyreva [1] demonstrated and formalized the
concept of blind signature schemes under the random oracle model and the computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Work by Chow et al. [5] proved, as well, unlinkability
properties of blind signatures. Camenisch et al. [2] proposed new constructions with-
out random oracle constraints, without achieving proofs against strong unforgeability.
Liao et al. [10] provide new schemes under the hardness of strong Diffie-Hellman as-
sumptions. Zhang and Kim [17], followed by Huang et al. [8], proposed identity-based
blind signatures, achieving unlinkability. Zhang et al. [18] uncovered linkability attacks
in [8] (signers being traced back under valid message-signature pairs). Pointcheval and
Stern [11] settled fundamental security properties of blind signatures. Schro¨der et al. [13]
offer fair guidelines for the security of blind signatures. They revisit the definition of
unforgeability in [11] and propose a new unforgeability definition to avoid adversaries
repeating a message for more than one signature.
The public verifiability of a signature is undesirable when a signature shares sensitive
information between the signer and the verifier. To deal with this situation, the signer
requires to sign the document for a fixed receiver with control on its verification. For
this purpose, the idea of undeniable signature [4] was suggested by Chaum and Van
Antwerpen. Desmedt and Yung reported in [7] some weaknesses in the aforementioned
approach. Jakobsson et al. [9] proposed a non-interactive designated verifier proof which
enables the signer to produce transfer-resistant signatures for a designated verifier. In
other words, the verifier does not possess the capability to transfer the proof of origin
of the signature to third parties. Jakobsson et al. [9] also suggested the necessity of
keeping the anonymity of signers. A concrete construction satisfying such constraints
(i.e., impossibility of transfer to third parties and signer anonymity) was provided by
Saeednia et al. in [12]. Identity-based versions inspired by the previous approach were
presented by Susilo et al. in [14], and later by Zhang and Wen in [19]. Limitations in [19]
include the lack of proofs for unverifiability, non-transferability and strongness, and the
possibility of a signer with direct access to the original message to blind and unblind
messages and signatures, hence not fulfilling the standard definition settled in [3,11,13].
The construction presented in this paper addresses such shortcomings.
Bitcoin-like transaction anonymity has been addressed by Yi et al. proposing schemes
achieving blindness and unforgeability [16]. More recently, Wang et al. in [15] has pro-
posed the application of designated verifier blind signatures for bitcoin proof-of-asset
transactions. When a vendor requires to an anonymous buyer to provide a proof of
solvency prior enabling an online service (e.g., a certain amount of bitcoins), the buyer
provides a proof about it in designated manner. Hence, only the specific vendor re-
questing solvency to the user can process the signature. The vendor cannot further use
this proof with any other third party. Our new construction addresses the same prob-
lem, offering a more compact construction over pairings, improving the efficiency of the
identity-based construction by Zhang and Wen in [19], and satisfying unverifiability,
non-transferability and strongness properties (cf. Section 3 and citations thereof).
2
3 Preliminaries
Next, we provide formal definitions related with the construction of identity-based
strong designated verifier blind signature (hereinafter, ID-SDVBS) schemes [19]. In such
schemes, a signer with identity IDS intends to send a signed message to a designated
verifier with identity IDV such that no one other than the designated verifier can verify
the signature. The scheme consists of the five algorithms described next:
1. params ← Setup(λ): Executed by the Private Key Generator (PKG), taking a se-
curity parameter λ as input and producing, as output, the master secret s and the
public parameters (params) of the system. The remaining algorithms listed below
receive all the values of params as implicit inputs.
2. (QID, SID) ← Key Extract(ID): The PKG takes as input an identity ID and pro-
duces, as output, a public and private key pair (QID, SID).
3. σ ← DVBSig(SIDS , QIDV ,m): Signer and user run this interactive process. Inputs
include the signer’s public and secret key (QIDS , SIDS ), the designated verifier’s public
key QIDV and a message m. Signer and user stop this process in polynomial time,
producing either a signature σ of m, or false (in case an error happens).
4. b ← DVBVer(SIDV , QIDS ,m, σ): Run by the verifier, taking as inputs SIDV (secret
key of the verifier), QIDS (public key of the signer), a message m and a signature σ.
It returns a bit b which is 1 if the signature is valid (otherwise, it returns 0 if the
signature is invalid).
5. σ̂ ← DVBSim(QIDS , SIDV ,m): Run by the verifier, it takes as inputs SIDV (verifier’s
secret key), QIDS and QIDV (public keys of the signer and the designated verifier),
and a message m. It generates a signature σ̂ as output.
In addition to correctness, unforgeability and blindness (cf. [19] for further details), we
aim at satisfying unverifiability, non-transferability and strongness properties.
Definition 1 (Unverifiability). An ID-SDVBS scheme is said to be existential des-
ignated unverifiabile against adaptive chosen message and adaptive chosen identities
attack if for any security parameter λ, no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A(λ,
t, ε, qH1 , qH2 , qE , qS , qV ) which runs in time t has a non-negligible advantage
ε := AdvEDV-CID2-CMA2ID-SDVBS,A (λ)
:=
∣∣Pr[A(QIDS∗ , QIDV ∗ ,m∗, σ∗) = 1]−
Pr[A(QIDS∗,QIDV ∗,m
∗,DVBSig(SIDS∗,QIDV ∗,m
∗))=1]
∣∣
against the challenger B’s response σ∗ in the following game:
1. Setup: Challenger B generates the system public parameters params from λ.
2. Query Phase 1 : – AdversaryAmay request up to qH1 hash queries on its adaptively
chosen identities; and up to qH2 hash queries on its adaptively chosen messages. A
may obtain responses from B, acting as a random oracle.
– A may request upto qE key extraction queries on its adaptively chosen identities
and obtain the corresponding private keys.
– A may request upto qS signature queries on its adaptively chosen messages and
adaptively chosen identities for the signer and the designated verifier and obtain a
valid strong designated verifier signature.
– A may request upto qV verification queries on signatures on its adaptively cho-
sen messages m and adaptively chosen identities for the signer and the designated
verifier and obtain the verification result 1 if it is valid and 0 if invalid.
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3. Challenge: At some point, A outputs a message m∗ and identitie ID∗S of the signer
and ID∗V of the designated verifier on which it wishes to be challenged such that A
has never submitted ID∗S or ID
∗
V during the key extraction queries. The challenger B
responds with a “signature” σ∗ and challenges A to verify if it is valid or not.
4. Query Phase 2 : A continues its queries as in Query Phase 1 with an additional
restriction that now it cannot submit a verification query on σ∗.
5. Output : A outputs a bit b∗ which is 1 if the signature is valid and 0 if invalid.
Definition 2 (Non-transferability). An ID-SDVBS scheme is said to achieve non-
transferability if the signature generated by the signer is computationally indistinguish-
able from that generated by the designated verifier, that is,
σ←DVBSig(QIDV , SIDS ,m) ≈ σ̂←DVBSim(QIDS , SIDV ,m).
Definition 3 (Strongness). An ID-SDVBS scheme is said to be strong designated
if given σ ← DVBSig(SIDS , QIDV ,m), anyone, say V
∗, other than the designated verifier
V can produce identically distributed transcripts that are indistinguishable from those
of σ from someone, say S∗, except the signer S. That is,
σ←DVBSig(QIDV , SIDS ,m) ≈ σ̂←DVBSim(QIDS∗ , SIDV ∗ ,m).
4 Proposed Construction
Find below the algorithms of our construction (Setup, Key Extract, Designated Blind
Signature DVBSig, Designated VerificationDVBVer and Transcript SimulationDVBSim):
– Setup – In this algorithm, on input security parameter λ PKG outputs the master
private key s ∈ Z∗q and the public parameters
params = (1λ, G1, G2, q, e,H1, H2, P, Ppub) ,
where G1 is an additive cyclic group of prime order q with generator P , G2 is a
multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q, and H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1, H2 : {0, 1}
∗ ×
G1 → Z
∗
q are two cryptographic secure collision resistant hash functions, and Ppub =
sP ∈ G1 is system’s public key, e : G1×G1 → G2 is a bilinear map (cf. Appendix A).
– Key Extract – On input identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}
∗, the PKG computes public key as
QIDi = H1(IDi) ∈ G1 and private key as SIDi = sQIDi ∈ G1, for this identity.
– DVBSig – Signs message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ (it can be verified by a designated verifier V ).
1. Signer S selects a random r
$
← Z∗q and calculates:
- U = rQIDS ∈ G1;
2. As commitment, the signer sends the calculated value U to the user.
3. Blinding Phase: In this algorithm, user selects x, y ∈R Z
∗
q as blinding factors.
Then calculates
- U ′ = xU + xyQIDS ;
- h = H2(m,U
′) ∈ Z∗q ;
- h1 = x
−1h+ y;
4. User sends this calculated value h1 to the signer.
5. Signing Phase: After receiving h1, the signer calculates
- V = (r + h1)SIDS ∈ G1; and sends back the user the value V .
6. Unblinding Phase: Then, the user calculates
- V ′ = xV
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- σ = e(V ′, QIDV ). (U
′, σ) ∈ G1 ×G2 is the strong designated verifier blind signa-
ture on the message m.
– DVBVer – After receiving signature (U ′, σ) on a message m, a verifier computes
h = H2(m,U
′) ∈ Z∗q and accepts the signature if σ = e(U
′ + hQIDS , SIDV ).
– DVBSim – The designated verifier V can produce the same signature σ̂ intended for
itself, by performing this algorithm: chooses an integer r̂, x̂, ŷ
$
← Z∗q and computes:
- Û = r̂QIDS ∈ G1;
- Û ′ = x̂U + x̂ŷQIDS ∈ G1;
- ĥ = H2(m, Û ′) ∈ Z
∗
q ;
- ĥ1 = x̂
−1ĥ+ ŷ;
- V̂ = (r̂ + ĥ1)QIDS ∈ G1;
- V̂ ′ = x̂V̂ ; and
- σ̂ = e(V̂ ′, SIDV ).
4.1 Security Analysis
If the generated signature (U ′, σ) on a message m from a signer with identity IDS for a
designated verifier with identity IDV , then the proposed scheme follows:
e(U ′ + hQIDS , SIDV ) = e(xU + xyQIDS + hQIDS , SIDV )
= e(xU + xyQIDS + hQIDS , sQIDV )
= e(xrQIDS + xyQIDS + hQIDS , sQIDV )
= e(x(rQIDS + yQIDS + x
−1hQIDS ), sQIDV )
= e(x(rSIDS + ySIDS + x
−1hSIDS ), QIDV )
= e(x(r + (x−1h+ y))SIDS , QIDV )
= e(x(r + h1)SIDS , QIDV )
= e(xV,QIDV )
= e(V ′, QIDV )
= σ .
Next, we discuss the achievement of following security properties: unverifiability, non-
transferability, strongness.
Theorem 1. (Unverifiability) Given a security parameter λ, if there exists a PPT
adversary A(λ, t, ε, qH1 , qH2 , qE , qS , qV ) which breaks the designated unverifiability of
the proposed ID-SDVBS scheme in time t with success probability ε, then there exists a
PPT adversary B(λ, t′, ε′) which solves DBDHP with success probability at least
ε′ ≥
(
1−
1
q2
)(
1−
2
qH1
)qE+qV
(
1−
2
qH1(qH1 − 1)
)qS( 2
qH1(qH1 − 1)
)
ε
in time at most
t′ ≤(qH1 + qE + 3qS + qV )SG1 + (qS + qV )Pe
+ qSOG1 + SG1 + SG2 + Pe + t
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where SG1 (resp. SG2) is the time taken for one scalar multiplication in G1 (resp. G2),
OG1 (resp. OG2) is the time taken for one group operation in G1 (resp. G2), and Pe is
the time taken for one pairing computation.
Theorem 2. (Non-transferability) Given two signatures (U ′, σ) and (Û ′, σ̂), both gen-
erated with message m by, respectively, the signer and the designated verifier, they are
indistinguishable. That is, the two distributions:
U = rQIDS ;
U ′ = xU + xyQIDS ;
h = H2(m,U
′);
h1 = x
−1h+ y;
V = (r + h1)SIDS ;
V ′ = xV ;
σ = e(V ′, QIDV );
and
Û = r̂QIDS ;
Û ′ = x̂U + xyQIDS ;
ĥ = H2(m, Û ′);
ĥ1 = x̂
−1h+ ŷ;
V̂ = (r̂ + ĥ1)QIDS ;
V̂ ′ = x̂V ;
σ̂ = e(V̂ ′, SIDV );
are identical.
Theorem 3. (Strongness) Let σ ← DVBSig(QIDV , SIDS ,m). Then σ ← DVBSim(QID∗S , SID∗V ,m)
(where QID∗
S
and SID∗
V
are defined as in the following) since
σ = e(xrSIDS + xh1SIDS , QIDV )
= e(xrSIDS + xh1SIDS ,mQID∗V ) where QIDV=mQID∗V
= e(xrmSIDS + xh1mSIDS , QID∗V )
= e(xrSID∗
S
+ xh1SID∗
S
, QID∗
V
) where SID∗
S
=mSIDS .
4.2 Performance Estimation
Inspired by the performance analysis discussed by Debiao et al. in [6], we discuss next
the expected computation time for the generation and verification of signatures using
our approach.
We assume the same pairing used by Debiao et al., i.e., a Tate pairing, which is
capable of achieving an equivalent of 1024-bit RSA security. It is defined over the
supersingular elliptic curve E = Fp : y
2 = x3 + x with embedding degree 2 was used,
where q is a 160-bit Solinas prime q = 2159 + 217 + 1 and p a 512-bit prime satisfying
p + 1 = 12qr. Accordingly, operation times are assumed as follows: 6.38 ms for each
scalar multiplication; 5.31 ms for each exponentiation in G2; 3.04 ms for each map-to-
point hash execution; and 20.04 ms for each pairing computation. Other operations,
such as the cost of an inverse operation over Z∗q , are omitted in our analysis, since it
takes less than 0.03 ms. Likewise, the operation time of performing one general hash
function is also omitted, since it is expected to take less than 0.001 ms, hence negligible
compared to the time taken by aforementioned (most costly) operations (cf. [6] and
citations thereof for further details).
A careful analysis of our approach shows that each signature generation would re-
quire five scalar multiplications (i.e., 6.38 ms each), one map-to-point hash execution
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(i.e., 3.04 ms), and one pairing computation (i.e., 20.04 ms). In other words, our ap-
proach would require about 54.98 ms per signature generation. In terms of signature
verification, our approach would require one scalar multiplication, one map-to-point
hash execution and one pairing computation. Hence, leading to about 29.46 ms per
signature verification. If we conduct now the same analysis to the closest approach in
the literature, i.e., the identity-based construction by Zhang and Wen in [19], we would
obtain about 67.74 ms per signature generation (i.e., five scalar multiplications, one
map-to-point hash execution and one pairing computation) and 89.58 ms per signa-
ture verification (i.e., one scalar multiplications, one map-to-point hash execution and
four pairing computations). Hence, and by using the performance analysis in [6], our
construction offers higher efficiency while addressing the limitations in [19] (i.e., lack
of Blinding and Unblinding procedures in their signature protocol, as well as lack of
unverifiability, non-transferability and strongness properties).
5 Conclusion
We have presented a designated verifier signature scheme to enable anonymity in proof-
of-asset transactions. It allows cryptocurrency users to prove their solvency in a privacy-
friendly manner, while designating a single authorized party (from a group of signature
requesters) to be able to verify the correctness of the transaction. The approach uses
pairing-based cryptography. More precisely, an adaptive approach using an identity-
based setting. The security of our construction has been proved using the hardness
assumption of the decisional and computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. We
have also presented an early estimation of the computation cost of our approach, in
terms of signature generation and signature verification. The estimation shows that the
computational cost and operation time of the new scheme is significantly more efficient
that previous efforts in the literature, while addressing the previous limitations.
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A Identity-Based Cryptography Preliminaries
A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm is a probabilistic random algorithm
that runs in time polynomial in the length of input. y
$
← A(x) denotes a randomized
algorithm A(x) with input x and output y. For X being a set v
$
← X stands for a
random selection of v from X . A function f : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible in n
if for any polynomial p and for sufficiently large n, the relation f(n) < 1/p(n) holds.
For an element g ∈ G, where G is a set, we denote the group G = 〈g〉 if g generates or
spans G.
Definition 4 (Bilinear Map). Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups with a prime
order q, where G1 is additive and G2 is multiplicative. Let P be the generator of G1.
Then a map e : G1 × G1 → G2 is said to be a cryptographic bilinear map if it fulfils
the below conditions.
Bilinearity: For all integers x, y ∈ Z∗q , e(xA, yA) = e(A,A)
xy, or equivalently, for all
A,B,C ∈ G1, e(A+B,C) = e(A,C)e(B,C) and e(A,B + C) = e(A,B)e(A,C).
Non-Degeneracy: The points A,B ∈ G1 with e(A,B) 6= 1. As G1 and G2 are prime
ordered groups this property is equivalent to have g := e(A,A) 6= 1, or in other words
g := e(A,A) is a generator of G2.
Computability: The map e(A,B) ∈ G2 can be computes efficiently for all A,B ∈ G1.
Definition 5 (Bilinear Map Parameter Generator). A bilinear map parameter
generator B is a PPT algorithm that takes as input security parameter λ and outputs
a tuple
〈q, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, P, g〉 ← B(λ) (1)
where q, G1, G2, e, P and g are as in Definition 4.
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Definition 6 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem). Given a security parameter λ,
let
〈q, e, P, g〉 ← B(λ) .
Let BDH : G1 ×G1 ×G1 → G2 be a map defined by BDH(X,Y, Z) = ω where
X = xP, Y = yP, Z = zP and ω = e(P, P )xyz .
The bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDHP) is to evaluateBDH(X,Y, Z) givenX,Y, Z
$
←
G1. (Without the knowledge of x, y, z ∈ Zq — obtaining x ∈ Zq, given P,X ∈ G1 is
solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)).
Definition 7 (BDHP Parameter Generator). A BDHP parameter generator C is
a PPT algorithm that takes as input security parameter λ and outputs a tuple
〈q, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, P, g,X, Y, Z〉 ← C(λ) (2)
where q, G1, G2, e, P , g, X , Y and Z are as in Definition 6.
Definition 8 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption). Given a security parameter
λ, let
〈q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z〉 ← C(λ) .
. The bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (BDHA) states that for any PPT algorithm
A which attempts to solve BDHP, its advantage AdvC(λ), defined as
Pr[A(q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z) = BDH(X,Y, Z)] ,
is negligible in λ.
Definition 9 (Decisional BDHP). Given a security parameter λ, let
〈q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z〉 ← C(λ) .
Let ω
$
← G2. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDHP) is to decide if
ω = BDH(X,Y, Z) .
That is, if X = xP, Y = yP, Z = zP , for some x, y, z ∈ Zq, then the DBDHP is to
decide if
ω = e(P, P )xyz .
(Without the knowledge of x, y, z ∈ Zq — obtaining x ∈ Zq, given P,X ∈ G1 is solving
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)).
Definition 10 (DBDHP Parameter Generator). A DBDHP parameter generator
D is a PPT algorithm that takes as input security parameter λ and outputs a tuple
〈q, e : G1 ×G1 → G2, P, g,X, Y, Z, ω〉 ← D(λ) (3)
where q, G1, G2, e, P , g, X , Y , Z and ω are as in Definition 9.
Definition 11 (Decisional BDHA). Given a security parameter λ, let
〈q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z, ω〉 ← D(λ) .
The bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDHA) states that, for any PPT algorithm
A which attempts to solve DBDHP, its advantage AdvD(λ), defined as[
Pr[adva(q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z, ω) = 1]−
Pr[A(q, e, P, g,X, Y, Z,BDH(X,Y, Z)) = 1]
]
, (4)
is negligible in λ.
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